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revenues. In any case, it is shifts in GDP caused by EU membership which should be assessed, not trade changes. Some of the assumptions underlying the calculations and the data used are also open to question, so that what appear to be compelling results have to be discounted.
Cohesion is the third reason for an EU budget. It also implies net payments, although the criterion in this instance is relative prosperity rather than whether or not the Member State gains relatively from EU integration. In most nation-states, fiscal transfers redistribute from rich to poor areas or from wealthy to badly-off social groups. In the EU setting, this redistribution occurs in a somewhat indirect manner.
Resources flow to rural areas through the CAP, but although two 'cohesion' countries -Greece and Ireland -gain substantially from the CAP, the targeting is very imprecise. The Structural Funds are explicitly designed to advance cohesion, but they do so principally by bolstering public investment, widely defined. The target here is the growth rate of assisted regions or the reintegration of marginalised social groups. Through this kind of support future, rather than current incomes should be advanced. The contrast between this approach and the solidarity mechanisms that most countries have is worth noting. German monetary union, for instance, involved massive transfers from West to East to sustain current incomes in the new Länder.
Although it is probably correct to say that transfers under the Structural Funds often slide into current incomes, the difference in philosophy remains.
The fourth way of looking at the EU budget is that it constitutes a club subscription for which the members of the club expect to obtain services. Just as members of a tennis club expect to obtain a fair share of time on court in return for their club subscription, many EU Member States look for a juste retour from the budget. A fair return need not mean a precisely equal return, but there is an expectation that the imbalance in net receipts or contributions should not be too great.
Background
The EU budget has changed significantly as the Union itself has evolved from the original customs union to a fully-fledged, if still incomplete, economic and monetary union. In the early days of the then EEC, most of the expenditure went on the common agricultural policy (CAP). Successive enlargements of the Union and the gradual 'deepening' of economic integration have seen more tasks assigned to the supranational level and a steady increase in the size of the budget.
In particular, the creation of the European Regional Development Fund and the greater emphasis given to 'cohesion' as an objective since the mid-1980s resulted in rapid growth in spending on what is now known as 'structural operations'.
The financing of the budget has also evolved considerably as it has expanded.
Originally, it was financed by grants from the Member States, but the aim was always to give the Union its own resources -taxes that 'belonged' directly to it and which did not depend on decisions by national finance ministers. In 1970, the proceeds of agricultural levies on products imported from the rest of the world and customs duties charged on imports were assigned to the Union, though
Member States continued to collect them and to retain 10% of the proceeds for this task. Because these two resources proved insufficient, a proportion of national VAT receipts (on a supposedly harmonised base) was then added as a third resource in 1979. A more flexible fourth resource was added in 1988, based on GNP. Since then efforts have been made to identify other potential tax instruments, but without conspicuous success (Begg and Grimwade, 1998; Gretschmann, 1998 The size of the EU budget is, thus, much more modest than might be inferred from the very heated negotiations that surround it. From very low levels at the beginning of the Community, it had grown to 1.15% of EU GDP by 1998 (Table   1) . 
Net contributions
In aggregate, the EU budget has to balance, but national contributions to, and receipts from, it do not. Mrs Thatcher's campaign in the early 1980s was about the inequitable nature of net contributions and other Member States have since also become agitated on this account. As noted above, the Commission, not without reason, argues that the gains from economic integration greatly outweigh the (fairly modest) net financial contributions, with the result that the focus on juste retour is unwarranted, although that will not deter net payers from doing the arithmetic.
In any attempt to measure net contributions, there are conceptual problems associated with the calculation that can give rise to confusion in the statistics, not to mention use of them that bears out Disraeli's well-known dictum. There are methodological problems in assigning both sides of the budget by Member State.
Customs duties, for instance, are collected at the point of entry into the Community, with the result that the Netherlands appears to make a very large payment (nearly three times its pro-rata share of GNP) under this heading. Questions also arise about the use of current as opposed to purchasing power adjusted exchange rates. In short, although the more extreme disparities emerge whatever measure is employed, it is a statistical minefield.
In Figure Finland, which has a per capita GNP marginally below that of the UK is a modest net beneficiary from the EU budget, as is Denmark which is the most prosperous Member State after Luxembourg. For the former, it is a combination of a relatively low gross contribution and slightly above average receipts from the Structural Funds that explains the balance, whereas Denmark continues to benefit disproportionately from the CAP even after the MacSharry reforms. Both France and Italy, the two remaining Member States, are modest net contributors: France because it receives much more from the CAP than its GNP 'share', and Italy because its share of gross contributions is well below its GNP share. The reason for this shortfall is that Italy collects less VAT per unit of GNP than other Member States.
Demands on the budget
The Commission prepared the ground for the Berlin summit by publishing proposals for the next seven years in the summer of 1997, a document known as
Agenda 2000 (EC, 1997). A subsequent document, published in October 1998
(EC, 1998b), set out options for the future financing of the EU, focusing especially on whether there should be changes in how the money to pay for the EU is raised. Although the word 'reform' features prominently in both documents, the reality is that the proposals largely preserve the status quo.
Various financing options were discussed, but the recommendation was to leave the own resources decision as it was, while on the spending side, both the ceiling for expenditure and the broad mix of outlays were to be continued. The one significant switch proposed was a gradual build-up of spending on the countries of central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), based on the working assumption (probably unrealistic even in 1997, let alone now) that new members would accede from 2002.
In the jousting that preceded the Berlin summit, a whole series of demands 13 surfaced, many of them mutually exclusive. Among these problems, the following are the most significant:
v Net contributions had, arguably, become too unbalanced. For the net contributors (or donors), the indirect gains -market access, freedom of capital movement, even the political binding together of Europe -must be assumed to outweigh the financial cost. This is the essence of the Commission argument for not focusing on juste retour. It can, however, be argued that, because net contributions are the result of unpredictable swings in expenditure on different types of policy, the implicit bargain had tilted too far against the main paymasters.
v Reform of the CAP is an imperative not just for enlargement, but also to meet the EU's obligations in global trading arrangements. Yet proposals to curb it are always resisted and a suggestion that national co-financing of CAP spending be implemented was, not surprisingly, resisted by net beneficiaries.
v The financing of the budget has become a hotch-potch which bears little relationship to ability to pay. Some Member States, notably Spain, have called for greater progressivity in gross contributions.
v The UK rebate is not only resented by other net contributors, but also has perverse incentive properties. But the UK argued that as the fifth poorest Member State, it should not be one of the principal net contributors.
v The rationale for the Cohesion Fund -set up to help the least well-off countries to maintain public investment while meeting the Maastricht criteriawas called into question, now that three of the four beneficiaries have joined the first wave of EMU.
The decisions taken in Berlin give something to everyone, but do so in a manner that has more to do with fudging or avoiding hard decisions rather than achieving lasting reform. Principles seem to have been ignored in favour of expediency.
The obvious retort is that this is not only how the EU always operates, but is also an inevitable feature of any process of bargaining. Yet while normative criteria may not feature as prominently as dispassionate observers might hope in settling the EU budget, it is worth looking at the how the deal was constructed, if only because the subsequent evolution of the EU will reflect the way it is financed and the expenditure it undertakes.
The principal fudges
The outcome on the CAP is especially unsatisfactory. Proposals to rein in EU spending by co-financing part of agricultural support from national sources were rejected. Two weeks before the summit, the agriculture ministers had agreed to cut some intervention prices, but to compensate farmers for their losses. Berlin actually watered down these reforms, thereby giving France and others an outcome they wanted. By 2006 CAP spending is planned to be about 2% higher in real terms than in 1999. The UK retains its abatement (although because of unanimity, it was never seriously in doubt), while the agreement probably does enough to mollify the major net contributors, but only by storing up future problems.
One of the over-riding political aims of the budget package was to diminish the imbalances in net contributions, particularly amongst the richer Member States that had formally applied for UK-style rebates (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden). Three different mechanisms will bring this about:
v First, the 'gang of four' will, in future, only have to pay 25% of their ex-ante share of the UK rebate, thereby displacing their share of the bill on to the other ten Member States. Chirac and Jospin were so tetchy about the continuation of the rebate. v Second, various 'particular situations' allowed for in the Structural Funds will result in increased net payments to these countries. Most of the 'particular situations' (see box 1) are, in effect, ad hoc exemptions from the rules which opens up the prospect that a plethora of new ones will be brought forward in future. None of these seems to be based on any discernible principle. Thus, 'to take account of the particular characteristics of labour market participation in the Netherlands, an additional amount of 500 million euros are allocated to v Third, changes in the method of financing the Union (less from traditional own resources and VAT; more from the GNP '4th' resource) will favour them. The first of these changes is that the proceeds from the two traditional own resources will now be subject to a 25% 'collection charge' that will accrue to Member States, instead of the 10% that currently applies. This will reduce the contribution of the two resources to barely 10% of the budget. The
Netherlands will obtain a large windfall gain, because of the Rotterdam effect.
The UK too would have obtained a windfall gain, but has agreed to forgo it.
The second change is a progressive reduction in the VAT resource in two steps from 1 percentage point of the proceeds of VAT to 0.5. Here too there will be minor shifts in the burden of payment, with the UK again agreeing to forgo the anticipated windfall gain.
To make up the difference in EU revenue, the fourth resource will, necessarily, account for a larger share of future revenue. This change will make gross contributions to the budget more directly proportional to GNP, supporting the aim of linking payments to ability to pay, though not ceding grounds to demands for progressivity. But it will also mean that the EU is funded predominantly by direct transfers from the Member States rather than by genuine own resources, undermining the financial autonomy of the EU and conflicting with article 201 of the Treaty. The outcome also means that not only does the anomaly of the UK rebate continue, but also that a further anomaly has been created for the four Member States given a discount on their contributions to the UK rebate.
On the structural and cohesion funds, the European Council had to reconcile demands from net contributors to receive more and to pay less. It was agreed 
The Berlin agreement assessed
The fact that a deal was reached at Berlin is by no means unimportant for the EU.
Given that the new Financial Perspective had to be ratified by the European claimed for the deal are that it paves the way for enlargement, striking a reasonable balance between the demands of the EU-15 and the expectations of the candidate countries, and that it does so without adding to the overall fiscal burden. But it can also be argued that, in concentrating in reaching a deal, the EU leaders have allowed urgency and expediency to over-ride longer term imperatives.
In particular, it is harder than before to see an underlying logic to the budget. The principles have been muddied rather than clarified, with a confusing mix of juste retour and funding for common policies underlying the decisions, but little evidence of any strategic view of what the budget should try to do as an instrument of policy.
The financing instruments have been revised, ostensibly to achieve greater fairness, but have ended up more anomalous than before. Even the modest reforms of the CAP agreed by the Agriculture Council prior to the Berlin meeting were watered down. Thus, while allowing all concerned to save face, the agreement solves few problems and leaves the future role of budget unclear. Some would argue that it was ever thus, and that expecting such difficult negotiations to yield outcomes that conform to academic models is pie in the sky. 6 Equally, if an agreement contains too many provisions that detract from its underlying purpose, it will eventually fall into disrepute. The next section explores how the budget might have been re-shaped.
Six missed opportunities
With EMU now started and enlargement on the horizon, the 2000-06 Financial
Perspective could have been the platform for a major rethink of all aspects of the EU budget. That it has not is, perhaps, a prime illustration of Scharpf's 'joint decision-trap' (Scharpf, 1988) . Rather than resolving the fundamental weaknesses in the system, the Berlin deal did just enough to mollify each of the participants in the horse-trading. Even if many of the issues considered here have little chance of being adopted, it is, nevertheless, useful to reflect on what might have been. A starting point would have been an unambiguous statement of the principles underlying the budget, its purpose and scope. Plainly, it does not fulfil the role of federal budgets elsewhere and cannot play much part in either stabilisation or redistribution policy, nor will it do so in future.
What could have been made clear was that the provisions in the Treaty were to be followed and that the aim of EU spending was to advance common policies, not to assure juste retour -however naive that might sound. Beyond that, the opportunity was also missed to map out the future responsibility of the EU level generally, and the budget in particular, in the economic management of the Union. The figure of 1.27 (the ceiling for financing as a percentage of EU GDP) has acquired near mystical significance, yet it has no economic rationale. Rather than deciding what tasks it makes sense for the EU to fulfil and assigning resources accordingly, the primary aim of Europe's leaders seems to have been to enforce the 1.27% limit, thereby ruling out any transfer of competence to the Community level in economic policy areas requiring public spending. Nor does it sit easily with the need to review Union commitments beyond the traditional areas in the first pillar. Monar (1997), for instance, is critical of the lack of thought that has gone into the funding of third pillar activities and the vagueness of funding for the CFSP is likely to be similarly unsatisfactory, especially post-Kosovo. Indeed, the EU's capacity to take on wider tasks -whether in areas such as peace-keeping or reconstruction of war damagewill be hampered by the absence of suitable funding.
The second broad area of criticism concerns the position of the budget in relation to EMU. Much has been made in the analysis of EMU of the lack of a fiscal counterpart to the ECB, the absence of automatic fiscal stabilisers and a lack of structural homogeneity (Feldstein, 1997; Bayoumi and Masson, 1995) . It would be far-fetched to believe that a fully-fledged 'federal' budget with the express purpose of countering some of these deficiencies could evolve given the mistrust in, and weakness of, the EU level. But without going that far it is plain that some shifts might be warranted (see, for example, Spahn, 1993a and 1993b) . The complete absence of any apparent willingness to explore the role of the budget in economic governance is, therefore, profoundly disturbing.
Enduring reform of the financing system is widely agreed to be necessary, yet equally widely agreed to be problematic. The Commission, in preparing the ground, effectively gave up any attempt to lead by opting not to advocate change and simply setting out options that might help to diminish excessive net contributions. The hotch-potch of financing instruments has been retained, but re-weighted and although it yields an outcome today that all the Member States find acceptable, it will not take much for this consensus to unravel. The lack of an easily identifiable fifth (or further) resource and of mechanisms for equalisation are reasons put forward for inaction, but they are not convincing. The problem is not in identifying new resources (see Smith, 1992; Begg and Grimwade, 1998; Gretschmann, 1998) , but in the political will to pursue change. Moreover, the reluctance on the part of Member States to budge on giving the Union genuine own resources, even though they have all signed up to Article 201 of the Treaty, shows that financial autonomy for the supranational level is still a remote possibility.
A fourth missed opportunity is that, once again, meaningful change in the CAP has here, as it is recognised that the large share of agriculture in the CEECs implies continuing upward pressure on spending on an unreformed CAP. Thus, although the package appears to offer enough for the CEECs, there must be a suspicion that other aspects of the deal are likely to delay enlargement. The missed opportunity to reform the budget may well have put the timing of enlargement in jeopardy.
As noted above, imbalances in net contributions had become a major concern. By adopting various devices to attenuate these imbalances, the EU's leaders have, arguably, resolved the problem for the forseeable future. Yet it is hard to believe that the series of ad hoc measures add up to an enduring answer especially since the result is a further anomaly on top of the UK rebate. It is very probable that fresh problems will arise requiring new mechanisms for limiting net contributions to be dreamed up before long to redress these unanticipated imbalances. Part of the difficulty has to do with the confusion about the objectives of the EU spending discussed previously. On the financing side, it is no great challenge to devise a formula that takes from each member either in proportion to wealth or according to some progressive formula under which the better-off pay a proportionally higher share of their incomes. 8 On the spending side, it is the nature of EU policies that shapes the distribution of receipts, so that if more equitable shares of spending are to be engineered, the way to do so is to review the policies.
Concluding remarks: where next?
The main conclusion of this paper is that the Berlin agreement has created a Financial Perspective that, while largely preserving the status quo, has aggravated rather than resolved the shortcomings in the EU budget. Certainly, the outcome, in the short-term, will be more equitable net contributions, but this has been achieved at the cost of watering-down the financial autonomy of the EU and establishing a porkbarrel approach to budgetary politics. Big decisions have been avoided, notably on CAP reform, and the lack of reform seems likely to make enlargement more of a challenge. A failure to agree would probably have resulted in a political and financial crisis for the EU, and the timing was hardly propitious for a more ambitious reform.
If there is a delay, the money will simply be returned to the Member States.
But it is hard to escape the conclusion that Berlin, echoing the reluctance at Amsterdam to confront institutional reform, was an exercise in damage limitation rather than an attempt to chart the way forward for the EU. A further examination of policy assignments is plainly needed, even if it is accepted that the EU level is a long way from having either the legitimacy needed to act as a federal government or the acquiescence of Member States to a more extensive role.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle here is the depth of resistance in many EU countries to the conventional federal model, although as Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) show, there are alternatives that might suit the EU better. The size and scope of the EU budget also warrant attention as, with a ceiling of 1.27% of GDP, it cannot fulfil the stabilisation or redistribution functions normally assigned to the highest tier of government. The trouble is that the joint decision-trap has been sprung and the various interlocutors cannot easily escape from it. One way forward might be an inter-institutional study group with terms of reference to look into all aspects of the EU budget.
These are thorny questions which highlight the continuing ambivalence about what the EU is and is expected to become. But it can also be argued that pretending that these questions can be ignored is the worst possible answer. a n y G r e e c e S p a i n F r a n c e I r e l a n d I t a l y L u x e m b o u r g N e t h e r l a n d s A u s t r i a P o r t u g a l F i n l a n d (a) For the development of the Lisbon region, a special phasing out treatment of 500 million euros will be provided for Objective 1.
(b) In recognition of the special efforts for the peace process in Northern Ireland, the PEACE Programme will be continued for five years with an amount of 500 million euros, of which 100 million euros will be allocated to Ireland. This programme will be implemented in full respect of additionality of structural fund interventions. The EU contribution to the International Fund for Ireland (15 million euros per annum under heading 3) will be renewed for a period of 3 years. The Commission is invited to make the necessary proposals. (f) In order to take account of the specific problems of East Berlin in the transformation process, 100 million euros will be added to the allocation for phasing out of East Berlin (Objective 1).
(g) The modification of the safety net provisions will add an additional 96 million euros for Italy and 64 million euros for Belgium to the phasing out allocation for Objective 2.
(h) An additional amount of 15 million euros will be provided for the Hainaut region in Belgium for Objective 1 phasing out.
(i) In view of the particular structural problems resulting from low population density matched with the high degree of poverty, the Highlands and Islands of Scotland will receive a special phasing out programme totalling 300 million euros.
(j) A special financial allowance will be given to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
